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INTRODUCTION 
For Feminist Judgments: Rewritten Opinions of the U.S. Supreme Court, I 
authored a feminist revision of the 1873 case of Bradwell v. Illinois,1 in which 
the U.S. Supreme Court upheld the denial of a license to practice law to Myra 
Bradwell—publisher of a highly regarded legal newspaper in Chicago—solely 
                                                        
*  Jacob Burns Foundation Professor of Clinical Law, George Washington University Law 
School. I extend my gratitude to Professors Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger, and Bridget 
J. Crawford for instigating and shepherding the U.S. Feminist Judgments Project and inviting 
me to rewrite from a feminist perspective the 1873 Supreme Court case of Bradwell v. Illinois. 
The insights in this article grew from accepting their invitation. I extend special gratitude to 
Linda Berger, who edited my contribution to the Feminist Judgments volume with skill, grace, 
and kindness. Thanks also to the Center for Constitutional Law at the University of Akron 
School of Law for hosting an invigorating Feminist Judgments symposium in October 2016. 
The symposium provided a welcome forum for engaging with others in refining these insights. 
1  Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (holding that “admission to the bar of a 
State of a person who possesses the requisite learning and character” is not a privilege and 
immunity of citizenship that, under the Fourteenth Amendment, a state must grant to a quali-
fied woman). 
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on the grounds that she was not a man.2 In rewriting Bradwell, I was bound by 
the guidelines of the Feminist Judgments Project that required authors to use the 
legal doctrine available at the time.3 Since I was assigned an opinion written in 
1873, initially that requirement worried me. But I came to appreciate it, because 
it prompted my immersion in the fascinating conceptual world of mid-to-late 
nineteenth century America, a time and place rocked by dramatic cultural change 
and possibility.4 
Since I was writing as a nineteenth century judge—by definition, a man—I 
began by reading about law and legal theory in the nineteenth century, in an effort 
not only to understand the doctrinal constraints of the era but also to capture the 
mindset of an 1870s judge. What were the events, issues, and dynamics that 
would be most salient and influential in the thinking of a judge writing at that 
time? How would those saliencies affect the judge’s patterns of thought and lan-
guage? I asked these questions because I wanted my 1873 opinion to be as au-
thentic a ruling as I could make it when writing from my early twenty-first 
century vantage point. 
Additionally, because I was engaged to write a feminist opinion for 
Bradwell, I needed to identify a legal pathway for the decision of an 1870s judge 
who believed in principles of equality under law and who cared about women’s 
lives and opportunities.5 I soon discovered that my task was not as creative as I 
first expected. To the contrary, I found that in the 1870s there was a sturdy legal 
architecture to support women’s equality, that there were vibrant equality move-
ments articulating sound legal arguments, and that Myra Bradwell was not just a 
woman who wanted to be a lawyer but also a participant in those movements.6 
Once my research brought the legal and political world of the nineteenth 
century into sharper relief, I saw vividly how much the arguments for women’s 
                                                        
2  See Phyllis Goldfarb, Judgment: Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130 (1873), in FEMINIST 
JUDGMENTS 60, 60 (Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford eds., 2016) 
[hereinafter FEMINIST JUDGMENTS]. 
3  See Kathryn M. Stanchi, Linda L. Berger & Bridget J. Crawford, Introduction to the U.S. 
Feminist Judgments Project, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 9 (“To make the point 
that law may be driven by perspective as much as stare decisis, it was critical that the feminist 
justices be bound, just as the original justices were, to the law and precedent in effect at the 
time.”). 
4  For a masterful examination of the tumult of the Reconstruction era following the devasta-
tion of the Civil War, see ERIC FONER, RECONSTRUCTION: AMERICA’S UNFINISHED 
REVOLUTION, 1863–1877, at xxv (Henry Steele Commager & Richard B. Morris eds., 1988) 
(“[Reconstruction] produced a sweeping redefinition of the nation’s public life and a violent 
reaction that ultimately destroyed much, but by no means all, of what had been accom-
plished.”). 
5  See Berta Esperanza Hernández-Truyol, Talking Back: From Feminist History and Theory 
to Feminist Legal Methods and Judgments, in FEMINIST JUDGMENTS, supra note 2, at 25 (“De-
spite varied meanings and diverse participants, feminisms throughout time have sought to bet-
ter the conditions of women’s lives, to advocate for the rights of women, to pursue women’s 
equality, and to liberate women and all sexes from cultural, legal, social, economic, and polit-
ical subordination.”). 
6  See infra notes 32–122 and accompanying text. 
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equality in the 1870s were connected to the issues and dynamics surrounding 
slavery, abolition, and the Civil War.7 The ways they were connected were inter-
esting and complicated, embedded in one gripping historical narrative after an-
other. In this Article, proceeding in three parts, I will share some of these 
nineteenth century narratives, analyze them, and try to pull some of their lessons 
into the twenty-first century. 
In Part I of this Article, I describe the relevant legal backdrop to Bradwell, 
the intertwined arguments of the Reconstruction-era movements for racial justice 
and gender justice, and the partial perspectives of the jurists deciding how to 
allocate rights and entitlements under the new constitutional mandates that fol-
lowed the end of the Civil War.8 In Part II, I examine the relevant political back-
drop to Bradwell’s claims and describe how law and politics intersected in battles 
over the meaning of the Reconstruction Amendments, most notably Section One 
of the Fourteenth Amendment, which requires states to protect all Americans’ 
privileges or immunities of citizenship.9 In Part III, I seek to extract timeless 
lessons for twenty-first century anti-subordination movements from the rich nar-
ratives and analyses evoked by the nineteenth century movement for women’s 
equality.10 
I.   DECLARING PARTIAL LAW  
A.   The Road Not Taken 
One of the first insights revealed by my time travel was this: We could have 
had women’s formal equality under law a century before Reed v. Reed outlawed 
sex discrimination.11 A significant part of the reason that the nineteenth century 
ended before women’s formal equality began was that courts refused to adopt 
what I now view as the best understandings of constitutional requirements in 
1873.12 This result was not accidental but structural. The fact that all courts, by 
                                                        
7  See infra notes 32–50 and accompanying text. 
8  See infra notes 11–50 and accompanying text. 
9  See infra notes 51–170 and accompanying text. 
10  See infra notes 171–218 and accompanying text. 
11  See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 77 (1971) (holding that an Idaho statute’s sex classification 
giving mandatory preferences to males as estate administrators violates equal protection under 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
12  The groundwork for the Court’s rejection of Bradwell’s argument was laid in the Slaughter-
House Cases. See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 53–55 (1872) (adopting a restrictive 
interpretation of the privileges and immunities of citizenship in denying relief to a group of 
independent butchers whose livelihoods were impeded by a Louisiana statute creating a 
slaughterhouse monopoly). See generally John Harrison, Reconstructing the Privileges or Im-
munities Clause, 101 YALE L.J. 1385, 1430–33 (1992) (arguing that the Privileges or Immun-
ities Clause is the Fourteenth Amendment’s foremost guarantee of equality because, unlike 
the Equal Protection Clause, it addresses which laws can be made and enforced). 
17 NEV. L.J. 565, GOLDFARB - FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  12:11 PM 
568 NEVADA LAW JOURNAL [Vol. 17:565  
definition and design, were staffed by judges who were beneficiaries of the struc-
tural inequalities whose legalities they were determining is not beside the point 
but likely is one of the central points itself.13 
If some number of the justices had acknowledged that their own perspectives 
were affected or skewed by their role as beneficiaries of the prevailing hierar-
chies, and tried to correct for the biases that this reality inevitably produced when 
these hierarchies were challenged under law, the constitutional perspective I ar-
ticulated in Bradwell might have been represented on the Supreme Court bench 
in the 1870s.14 Had that occurred, the law might have developed quite differ-
ently—not only for women but for other subordinated classes as well—over sub-
sequent generations to the present day.15 If the strong legal arguments presented 
during the first wave of feminism had met more success, the second wave of 
feminism might have unfolded very differently and confronted different chal-
lenges.16 While it is impossible to truly re-imagine the world that might have 
emerged from this counterfactual history, at the very least it does seem that Pauli 
Murray would not have needed to devise the equal protection strategy that she 
articulated in Jane Crow and the Law,17 and Ruth Bader Ginsburg would have 
found other valuable pursuits for the American Civil Liberties Union’s Women’s 
                                                        
13  See Theresa M. Beiner, What Will Diversity on the Bench Mean for Justice?, 6 MICH. J. 
GENDER & L. 113, 130, 148 (1999) (stating that although research on diversity’s effect on 
justice “has been hampered in the past by the small number of non-white male judges,” some 
recent studies indicate that “the diversity they bring to the bench has an actual effect on the 
outcome of cases”). 
14  See Martha Minow, Stripped Down Like a Runner or Enriched by Experience: Bias and 
Impartiality of Judges and Jurors, 33 WM. & MARY L. REV. 1201, 1217 (1992) (arguing that 
impartial judging involves awareness of one’s own perspectives and a sufficiently open mind 
to learn from other points of view, thereby avoiding the risk of “leaving unexamined the very 
assumptions that deserve reconsideration”); see also JANE M. FRIEDMAN, AMERICA’S FIRST 
WOMAN LAWYER: THE BIOGRAPHY OF MYRA BRADWELL 22 (1993) (stating that in the 1870s, 
“the specter of nationwide woman’s suffrage” was “terrifying”). 
15  See Minow, supra note 14, at 1206 (“[T]he Court’s impartiality is threatened if it appears, 
because of its own narrow membership, to lack an understanding of the broad range of people 
who come before it.”). 
16  The first wave of feminism is typically understood as spanning the nineteenth century 
women’s rights movement and continuing through the passage of the Nineteenth Amendment 
in 1920. The second wave of feminism is understood as the women’s rights movement of the 
late twentieth century. Some suggest that feminism is currently experiencing a third wave. See 
RORY DICKER, A HISTORY OF U.S. FEMINISMS 103 (2008) (“[I]t is relatively easy to locate the 
origins of the first and second waves of the women’s movement . . . the Seneca Falls Conven-
tion in 1848 . . . for the first wave and . . . the Miss America protest in 1968 for the second—
finding a beginning moment for the third wave . . . [is] more complicated.”). 
17  Pauli Murray & Mary O. Eastwood, Jane Crow and the Law: Sex Discrimination and Title 
VII, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 232, 235–42 (1965) (delineating a set of legal arguments for es-
tablishing formal gender equality under law through the Equal Protection Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
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Rights Project besides adopting Murray’s legal blueprint and litigating cases to 
establish simple formal equality under law on the basis of sex.18 
Unfortunately, we inherited the unequal world that we did, in part because 
the judges of the 1870s did not understand their own partiality. In the world they 
knew, privileged white men had always been entrusted with shaping the rules 
and deciding the fates of all others, including women and African-Americans.19 
In that respect, the fate of privileged white women like Myra Bradwell resembled 
that of African-American men and women, most of whom had just been released, 
penniless and despised, from more than two centuries of race-based chattel slav-
ery.20 
B.   Interactive Activism 
Although the conditions of life for each group varied profoundly, develop-
ments in American history, including American legal history, linked the fates of 
those experiencing discrimination on the basis of race and those experiencing 
discrimination on the basis of gender.21 While the relevant sets of discriminatory 
                                                        
18  See Neil A. Lewis, The Supreme Court: Woman in the News; Rejected as a Clerk, Chosen 
as a Justice: Ruth Joan Bader Ginsburg, N.Y. TIMES (June 15, 1993), http://www.ny-
times.com/1993/06/15/us/supreme-court-woman-rejected-clerk-chosen-justice-ruth-joan-ba-
der-ginsburg.html [https://perma.cc/KU6B-9F8N] (“As the director of the Women’s Rights 
Project of the American Civil Liberties Union, Ms. Ginsburg adopted a strategy intended to 
convince the Justices that laws that discriminated between men and women—even those laws 
that were meant to help women—were based on unfair and harmful stereotypes and were in 
most cases unconstitutional.”). 
19  See NANCY F. COTT, THE GROUNDING OF MODERN FEMINISM 4 (1987) (defining the equality 
concerns of feminism as “opposition to one sex’s categorical control of the rights and oppor-
tunities of the other”); see also CATHERINE CLINTON, THE OTHER CIVIL WAR: AMERICAN 
WOMEN IN THE NINETEENTH CENTURY 76 (1984) (quoting the platform of an 1851 women’s 
rights conference as rejecting “the right of any portion of the species to decide for another 
portion . . . what is and what is not their ‘proper sphere’: that the proper sphere for all human 
beings is the largest and highest to which they are able to attain”); DICKER, supra note 16, at 
25 (describing the “constrained social roles available to women” in the nineteenth century, 
such that early feminists “advocated women’s access to education and jobs”). 
20  Many nineteenth century feminists like Elizabeth Cady Stanton compared the patriarchal 
authority that constrained women’s freedom to the condition of slavery. See CLINTON, supra 
note 19, at 70 (quoting Stanton as saying that unlike the white man “born to do whatever he 
can, for the woman and the negro there is no such privilege”). 
21  Id. (“[W]omen abolitionists were formidable opponents in the moral war against slavery. . . . 
[W]omen turned these egalitarian sentiments for blacks into the basis for a ‘holy war’ for 
themselves.”). Of course, women of color experienced the interaction of race and gender dis-
crimination. See Adrien Katherine Wing, Introduction to CRITICAL RACE FEMINISM 1, 7 
(Adrien Katherine Wing ed., 2d ed. 2003) (“[W]omen of color are not merely white women 
plus color or men of color plus gender. Instead, their identities must be multiplied together to 
create a holistic One when analyzing the nature of the discrimination against them.”) (footnote 
omitted). 
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practices diverged dramatically for these groups, challenges to each set of prac-
tices were legally linked.22 Prospects for successful legal challenges depended 
on making similar claims, which were grounded in similar understandings of 
democratic equality, federal-state power relations, and the post-Civil War legal 
structure.23 
Consequently, the theory and practice of the major anti-subordination move-
ments of the nineteenth century overlapped significantly. There were many types 
of overlap, including people involved in both movements.24 Many Northern 
white women, assigned by nineteenth century gender ideology to the domestic 
sphere, first developed self-identities as public actors in the movement to abolish 
slavery.25 Their public roles expanded during the Civil War, as they participated 
in war relief efforts and took over civic and commercial activities in place of men 
gone to battlefields.26 At war’s end, some women became active in federal gov-
ernment efforts during Reconstruction, including the Freedmen’s Bureau, while 
others traveled South as teachers to participate in literacy education for the mil-
lions of people newly freed from slavery’s deprivations.27 
Many of the women who participated, in ways large and small, in remaking 
American society before and after the Civil War had internalized the egalitarian 
rhetoric of the era, seeing its application not only to the lives of freed slaves but 
to their own lives as well.28 They glimpsed a future in which full “citizenship” 
rights—their conceptual category for the entitlements due to all inhabitants of a 
                                                        
22  DICKER, supra note 16, at 39 (“At the end of the war, abolitionists and women’s rights 
activists formed the American Equal Rights Association (AERA), whose goal was to gain civil 
rights for both black people and [white] women.”). 
23  See infra notes 32–50 and accompanying text. 
24  See CLINTON, supra note 19, at 54 (“Female moral reformers and abolitionists were main-
stays of the antebellum women’s movement.”). 
25  Id. at 71–72 (“[F]emale participation was not only substantial but essential to bringing the 
slavery issue to the forefront of sectional politics. . . . [T]he fight to free slaves propelled 
women into an equally long, rigorous fight for their own liberation. . . . [M]ost feminists ac-
quired public-speaking skills in the antislavery forum.”). 
26  Id. at 81 (“When war broke out, it was easy for the government to draw on middle-class 
women’s talent and experience on behalf of war relief. . . . Women used many of the innova-
tions developed during the antislavery days, such as the sponsoring of fairs and bazaars, to 
raise funds.”); id. at 92 (“The war gave many unparalleled opportunities to explore new fields 
and to pioneer on behalf of their sex. . . . afford[ing] access to jobs which [white women] were 
denied in peacetime.”). 
27  Id. at 88 (“[N]orthern women . . . serve[d] in the South, to fill positions with the newly 
established Freedmen’s Bureau. . . . to assist freed blacks . . . . By 1869 there were nine thou-
sand teachers for ex-slaves in the South, and nearly half were women.”). 
28  See JUDITH A. BAER, EQUALITY UNDER THE CONSTITUTION 123–24 (1983) (“[L]egislation 
on the basis of woman’s traditional role in the family amounts to a role assignment by the 
dominant members of society for their own convenience, and that sounds suspiciously like 
slavery. If slavery for blacks was odious, so is pseudo-slavery for women.”). 
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democratic republic—belong not just to white men but equally to all people, re-
gardless of race, gender, or class.29 These ideas took their most organized form 
in the women’s suffrage movement, though its claims for civil and political rights 
went well beyond attaining the franchise.30 Former slaves and African-American 
activists, such as Frederick Douglass and Ida B. Wells-Barnett, were also in-
volved in the movement for women’s suffrage.31 
C.   Interlocking Legal Theories 
An important path towards equality forged by nineteenth century activists 
pursuing both race and gender justice was a legal theory rooted in constitutional 
design. The theory began with the awareness that in establishing America’s foun-
dational principles as a republic, the Declaration of Independence had declared 
a human rights principle as a self-evident truth: that all were created equal and 
that by virtue of their fundamental equality, all people were entitled to inaliena-
ble rights.32 Of course, colonial and antebellum practices—most notably, slavery 
and coverture—contradicted this anti-subordination philosophy, but nineteenth 
century equality theorists did not view these practices as undermining the Con-
stitution’s true meaning.33 
In fact, powerful factions of the anti-slavery movement expressed claims in 
the idiom of constitutionalism. These abolitionists challenged the constitutional-
ity of slavery with the argument that the egalitarian language of the Declaration 
                                                        
29  See Norma Basch, Reconstructing Female Citizenship: Minor v. Happersett, in THE 
CONSTITUTION, LAW, AND AMERICAN LIFE 52, 52 (Donald G. Nieman ed., 1992) (“As black 
codes menaced the viability of black citizenship and promoted efforts to define and guarantee 
citizenship through constitutional amendments, the amendments, in turn, unleashed a long and 
arduous struggle over the terms of female citizenship.”). 
30  The Declaration of Sentiments, drafted by Elizabeth Cady Stanton and her colleagues who 
attended the first women’s convention at Seneca Falls, New York in 1848, listed numerous 
grievances and resolutions, one of which was “the duty of the women of this country to secure 
to themselves their sacred right to the elective franchise.” RICHARD CHUSED & WENDY 
WILLIAMS, GENDERED LAW IN AMERICAN HISTORY 92 (2016). In the nineteenth century, the 
women’s movement was known as “the woman movement.” See COTT, supra note 19, at 3 
(“Nineteenth-century women’s consistent usage of the singular woman symbolized, in a word, 
the unity of the female sex.”). 
31  Frederick Douglass, who attended the Seneca Falls Convention and was the only man at 
the convention to speak on behalf of women’s suffrage, persuaded Elizabeth Cady Stanton, 
who was initially reluctant to do so, to include suffrage in the list of resolutions. See PAULA 
GIDDINGS, WHEN AND WHERE I ENTER 126 (1984). Ida B. Wells-Barnett founded a black 
women’s suffrage organization, and was an associate of Susan B. Anthony’s. Id. at 120, 125 
(“Wells-Barnett and Anthony would have long discussions about the race and women’s is-
sues.”). 
32  See GARRETT EPPS, AMERICAN EPIC 141 (2013) (“The Framers all more or less subscribed 
to the idea Jefferson phrased memorably in the Declaration of Independence: ‘that all men . . . 
are endowed by their creator with certain unalienable rights.’ ”). 
33  See BAER, supra note 28, at 64 (quoting John Bingham, principal drafter of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, who observed that “[t]he equality of all to the right to live; to the right to know; 
to argue and to utter, according to conscience; to work and enjoy the product of their toil, is 
the rock on which that Constitution rests”). 
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of Independence, the document that established the principles that launched the 
nation, was incorporated into the Constitution, the document that established the 
nation’s rules of operation.34 Despite the fact that slavery is not prohibited by the 
text of the original Constitution—because the political realities of forming a un-
ion of free and slave states in 1787 could not accommodate such a prohibition—
some abolitionists argued that the Declaration’s equality principles imbued the 
spirit of the Constitution.35 It could not be otherwise, their argument ran, because 
our two national blueprints could not be inconsistent.36 The egalitarian spirit nec-
essary to each simply became more explicit as a constitutional principle once the 
Reconstruction Amendments were adopted.37 Echoing the Declaration, the rati-
fication of the Fourteenth Amendment made equality—inchoate and contested 
as its meaning was—a universal entitlement of American citizenship.38 
Consequently, by the 1870s, the legal theory of equal justice for both Afri-
can-Americans and white women rested on a reading of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment, understood at the time as explicitly translating the central equality premise 
of the Declaration of Independence into the constitutional text.39 The language 
of the Amendment was inclusive, proclaiming that citizens of the states were also 
federal citizens who had privileges and immunities by virtue of their status as 
Americans.40 As a result, the federal government was obliged to protect their 
broad rights as national citizens—which included the rights to due process and 
equal protection of the laws—by limiting any state’s abrogation of these national 
citizenship rights.41 
                                                        
34  Id. at 62 (“Not only was the Declaration, in effect, part of the Constitution, but, a fortiori, 
so were the principles of natural law which it expressed. Men were equal, and endowed with 
rights, under the United States Constitution; therefore, slavery violated it.”). 
35  Id. (quoting an abolitionist who testified to Congress in 1836 that “slavery makes war upon 
the principles of the Declaration, and the spirit of the Constitution”). 
36  Id. at 60–61 (describing the abolitionist view that “the Constitution already forbade slavery” 
because its text had to be interpreted “to incorporate, or at the very least not to traduce, the 
ideas of the Declaration”). 
37  Id. at 64 (asserting that the Fourteenth Amendment was “conceived of as ‘declaratory’ of 
what was already in the Constitution”). 
38  Id. at 102–04 (arguing that congressional debates on the Fourteenth Amendment suggest 
that the Amendment is grounded in “a notion of equality [under law] based on natural entitle-
ment [of human beings] to rights, derived from the Declaration” and intended to protect all 
American citizens from oppression). 
39  See Basch, supra note 29, at 53 (“[T]he spacious terms of the first section of the Fourteenth 
Amendment carried a new, albeit ambiguous, promise of legal and constitutional equality.”). 
40  Id. (“In gender-neutral language [the Fourteenth Amendment] prohibited states from deny-
ing any person equal protection of the laws or abridging the privileges and immunities of U.S. 
citizens.”). 
41  See Thurgood Marshall, Essay, The Constitution’s Bicentennial: Commemorating the 
Wrong Document?, 40 VAND. L. REV. 1337, 1340–41 (1987) (“[After the Civil War] arose a 
new, more promising basis for justice and equality, the fourteenth amendment, ensuring pro-
tection of the life, liberty, and property of all persons against deprivations without due process, 
and guaranteeing equal protection of the laws.”). 
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Not surprising in the wake of the secession and treason of the slave states 
that had galvanized the Civil War, the Fourteenth Amendment accorded the fed-
eral government power over states in protecting individual freedom.42 While the 
colonists at the time of the Revolutionary War may have been most concerned 
with the tyranny of centralized power like the monarchy they were overthrowing, 
Americans by the time of the Civil War vividly discerned the problem created 
by the tyranny of a state’s decentralized power as well.43 Therefore, the Four-
teenth Amendment clarified that, as a constitutional matter, the states had to pro-
tect the rights of their citizens just as the federal government was required to 
do.44 Moreover, the Fourteenth Amendment clarified the power of Congress to 
pass federal legislation that enforced all citizens’ Fourteenth Amendment 
rights.45 
After the ratification of the Fourteenth Amendment in 1868, the women’s 
suffrage movement argued that Section One granted women full national citizen-
ship, with all its entitlements, just as the Reconstruction Amendments granted 
full national citizenship—at least in theory—to African-American men.46 Unfor-
tunately, when women like Myra Bradwell asked courts to uphold the robust le-
gal protections embedded in the Fourteenth Amendment’s language, most judges 
rejected the arguments.47 The perceived link between Bradwell’s asserted right 
under the Constitution to a profession of her choosing and the highly contentious 
issue of women’s right to suffrage created a volatile context for fair adjudication 
                                                        
42  See EPPS, supra note 32, at 169 (“[T]he new nation that emerged from the Civil War could 
not exist as a self-governing, democratic republic without strong federal monitoring of indi-
vidual rights.”). 
43  Id. at 158 (“[T]he Fourteenth [Amendment] radically alters the structure of the government 
created in 1787 . . . .”); see also Rogers M. Smith, “One United People”: Second-Class Fe-
male Citizenship and the American Quest for Community, 1 YALE J. L. & HUMAN. 229, 229 
(1989) (explaining that Americans replaced “English subjectship with the particular political 
status they created, citizenship in a commercial republic guaranteeing various personal, eco-
nomic, and intellectual freedoms”); id. at 239 (describing Revolutionary War views of states 
as a bulwark against “potentially despotic central government” that provided “a frequent, ef-
fective shield for state and local oppressions against women and other unempowered groups,” 
the problem which the Reconstruction Amendments sought to address). 
44  See EPPS, supra note 32, at 168 (“[The Fourteenth Amendment] indicates that states must 
respect the same limits as the federal government when they deal with any American citizen, 
their own citizens or not.”). 
45  Id. at 181 (“Section Five . . . points to Congress as the enforcer of all four sections [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment],” giving Congress “the power, ‘by appropriate legislation,’ to enforce 
the amendment.”). 
46  See Ellen Carol DuBois, Taking the Law into Our Own Hands: Bradwell, Minor, and Suf-
frage Militance in the 1870s, in VISIBLE WOMEN 19, 22 (Nancy A. Hewitt & Suzanne Lebsock 
eds., 1993) (elaborating the suffragists’ argument that “national citizenship had finally been 
established as supreme by the first section of the Fourteenth Amendment,” and that “the ben-
efits of national citizenship were equally the rights of all”). 
47  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (holding by a vote of 8–1 that a qual-
ified woman’s choice to enter the profession of law is not a privilege of national citizenship 
protected by the Fourteenth Amendment). 
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of her claims.48 Similarly, the link between arguments for broad construction of 
the Fourteenth Amendment made on behalf of women’s rights activists and those 
made on behalf of freed African-American slaves tapped into a roiling contro-
versy that impeded impartial and independent consideration of Bradwell’s argu-
ments.49 Many among the powers-that-be sought to limit and control the societal 
reconstruction that the Civil War had necessitated.50 
II.   RE-CONSTITUTING AMERICA: LAW AND POLITICS IN FOURTEENTH 
AMENDMENT JURISPRUDENCE 
A.   HerStory and History 
The cultural and legal conflicts that influenced Bradwell’s case had pervaded 
her life from the start.51 Born into an active abolitionist family, Myra Bradwell 
was likely familiar with the constitutional vision of equality that characterized 
the anti-slavery movement.52 This vision may have influenced her thinking dur-
ing the Civil War when she was involved with other women in war relief and 
substantial fundraising efforts for wartime medical care.53 The combination of a 
constitutional vision of universal citizenship rights and women’s increased in-
volvement in civic activities foreshadowed Bradwell’s decision to apply for a 
license to practice law.54 Her decision to do so enabled her to make a case for 
                                                        
48  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 23–25 (describing the Fourteenth Amendment arguments 
made by the suffragists as “militant” and “activist,” because their “basic message was that the 
vote was already women’s right; they merely had to take it,” leading to numerous examples of 
“women’s direct action voting” between 1868–72); see also CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 
30, at 857 (“In many ways, [Bradwell’s] case encapsulated the history of the post-War suffrage 
movement.”). 
49  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 864 (“Though her brief was a bit vague, 
Bradwell was presumably arguing that the recently ratified Fourteenth Amendment estab-
lished protections for women as well as freed slaves.”). 
50  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 32 (stating that after the Presidential election of 1872, the 
Republican Party “retreat[ed] from the radical implications of the postwar amendments”); see 
also BAER, supra note 28, at 105 (“The promises of Reconstruction were not kept.”). 
51  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 35 (stating that though “little is known about Myra’s 
childhood . . . . [b]oth of her parents were prominent in the antislavery movement”). 
52  Id. (noting that Bradwell’s parents were “close friends of the family of Elijah Lovejoy, a 
newspaper publisher and staunch abolitionist who was murdered . . . by a proslavery mob” 
and that Myra’s friend Owen Lovejoy, Elijah’s brother, “frequently” told Myra the “story of 
Lovejoy’s role in the abolitionist struggle”); see also JILL NORGREN, REBELS AT THE BAR 39 
(2013) (observing that in 1870, “[c]itizenship and political rights were very much on 
Bradwell’s mind”). 
53  During the war, Myra Bradwell was exceptionally active in fundraising and other war relief 
efforts, serving as president of the Chicago Soldiers’ Aid Society. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 
14, at 42 (indicating that Bradwell “became intensely involved in a number of women’s phil-
anthropic organizations that had been formed for the purpose of raising money for the Union 
Army’s sick and wounded soldiers and their families”). 
54  Bradwell’s application to the Illinois bar was submitted approximately six weeks after the 
first woman in the country was admitted to the bar—Arabella Mansfield in the state of Iowa. 
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women’s rights and opportunities while lending support to their professional am-
bitions.55 
After reading law in her husband’s law office and passing the state bar exam 
with high honors,56 Bradwell founded the Chicago Legal News, a respected 
weekly newspaper for the legal profession.57 With the success and demands of 
her growing publishing business, it is unclear whether she actually intended to 
practice law, but there is no question that she was qualified to become a member 
of the bar.58 When Illinois denied her application solely on the ground that she 
was a woman, she appealed to the Illinois Supreme Court.59 
Some of Bradwell’s able appellate arguments in support of her admission 
were grounded in state law, such as: (1) the absence of an express statutory pro-
vision prohibiting women from becoming lawyers in Illinois; (2) the directive in 
a state statutory instruction to construe the word “he” to mean “he or she”; and 
(3) the revisions in state law that had undermined the disabilities that accompa-
nied coverture and permitted her to make her own contracts and retain her own 
earnings.60 But after the heavily publicized ratification process of the ballyhooed 
Reconstruction Amendments, she added to her state law arguments a claim that 
the state’s refusal on the grounds of gender to grant her membership in the bar 
denied her a privilege of citizenship—the right to choose a livelihood—that she 
                                                        
Id. at 18 (stating that “Mansfield was a teacher of English and history who had no intention of 
practicing law” but her admission was part of a plan devised to promote women’s equality). 
55  Id. at 20 (In her brief to the Illinois Supreme Court challenging the denial of her admission 
to the bar, Bradwell cited changes in state law granting women social and economic rights, 
reported on the admission of some women to law schools, and “discussed the recent opening 
to women of other trades and occupations from which they had previously been barred.”). 
56  Id. at 18. 
57  See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 30 (“It was . . . Myra’s genius to . . . use her training in law 
as well as [her] management skills acquired during the war to build a national publishing em-
pire specializing in legal materials. . . . [T]he Chicago Legal News . . . would make her wealthy 
while providing a place for the advocacy of women’s rights.”). 
58  Id. at 28, 37–38 (stating although once Myra might have wished to enter the bar to help her 
husband in his law practice, the subsequent success of her publishing business suggested that 
“[f]or Bradwell, bar admission would be a personal and political victory, reinforcing women 
in their professional ambitions and quest for rights”). 
59  Initially the Illinois Supreme Court rejected her bar application because she was a married 
woman. See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 18–19 (quoting the letter Bradwell first received 
from the court’s reporter stating that she was denied bar membership because “you would not 
be bound by the [contractual] obligations necessary to be assumed where the relation of attor-
ney and client shall exist, by reason of the disability imposed by your married condition”) 
(alteration in original) (emphasis omitted). But when Myra challenged this decision, arguing 
in part that Illinois statutes had recently removed some of the historical legal disabilities for 
married women, the Illinois Supreme Court stated that denial of Bradwell’s bar application 
was based not on her status as a married woman but simply on her status as a woman. Id. at 
20. 
60  See Nancy T. Gilliam, A Professional Pioneer: Myra Bradwell’s Fight to Practice Law, 5 
L. & HIST. REV. 105, 109–10 (1987) (delineating Bradwell’s state law arguments). 
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was guaranteed under the Fourteenth Amendment.61 When the Illinois Supreme 
Court denied all her arguments, she petitioned the United States Supreme Court 
for its first interpretation of the meaning of the brand new Fourteenth Amend-
ment.62 
B.   The Nineteenth Century’s (Un)Popular Constitutionalism 
The constitutional arguments that Bradwell would advance at the Supreme 
Court were gathering steam among nineteenth century activists. In 1869, Francis 
and Virginia Minor, a lawyer-husband and suffragist-wife team living in Mis-
souri, developed a sophisticated constitutional argument for women’s equality 
with men as autonomous political actors.63 Although the specific version of their 
argument that addressed women’s suffrage would reach the Supreme Court after 
Bradwell’s case, their general constitutional arguments for women’s rights had 
been shared in women’s suffrage gatherings and publications, where Bradwell 
likely encountered them and later incorporated them into the litigation challeng-
ing her exclusion from the profession of law.64 Therefore, although Bradwell 
                                                        
61  Id. at 114 (stating that on December 31, 1869, Bradwell filed in the Illinois Supreme Court 
a document containing two constitutional arguments, “an undeveloped equal rights claim and 
a privileges and immunities argument”). 
62  Id. at 116–17 (“Because this was the first examination by the Supreme Court of the meaning 
of the Civil War amendments . . . [t]he issue is usually phrased thusly: Did the fourteenth 
amendment bring about a radical change in the balance of power between the state and federal 
governments?”). 
63  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 21–22 (noting that in October 1869, Francis and Virginia 
Minor presented the women’s suffrage movement with “an elaborate and elegant interpreta-
tion of the Constitution” for advancing women’s rights, including the right to vote). 
64  The Minors’ constitutional argument for women’s suffrage was rejected by a unanimous 
Supreme Court. Minor v. Happersett, 88 U.S. 162, 178 (1874) (holding that suffrage was not 
a protected right of citizenship guaranteed to women by the Fourteenth Amendment). Myra 
Bradwell was “one of the Midwest’s preeminent suffragists,” whose efforts on behalf of the 
women’s suffrage movement were “substantial.” See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 167. 
Bradwell served as corresponding secretary of the women’s suffrage convention held in Cleve-
land in November 1869, where the Minors’ argument was likely discussed. Id. at 170–71. The 
convention had been called by Lucy Stone to organize the American Woman Suffrage Asso-
ciation for suffragists who, unlike Stanton and Anthony, did not oppose the Fifteenth Amend-
ment. Id. at 169–70. In January, 1869, the National Woman Suffrage Association adopted a 
resolution stating that women’s disenfranchisement violated the privileges and immunities of 
citizenship protected by the Fourteenth Amendment. See Basch, supra note 29, at 53–54. In 
January, 1870, Francis Minor published a letter indicating that the legal strategy he had devel-
oped with his wife was presented as a resolution at the Missouri National Woman Suffrage 
Association, where Virginia Minor was the president. Id. at 59. Serving as an officer in the 
American Woman Suffrage Association and a member of the executive committee of the Illi-
nois State Suffrage Association, and keeping abreast of developments in the struggle for 
woman suffrage for her newspaper, Bradwell undoubtedly was aware of the constitutional 
interpretations emerging at that time from the suffragists’ movement. See FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 14, at 176–77 (stating that Bradwell not only served as an officer of suffrage organiza-
tions, she also reported frequently on the organizations’ activities). 
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may have been the lone plaintiff in her case, she represented the hopes of swell-
ing numbers of nineteenth century women who sought autonomy, choice, and 
larger civic and political roles.65 
The contested question of the hour was whether all American citizens would 
be entrusted with full and equal rights of citizenship. Bradwell understood that 
her case would bear broadly and directly on women’s civil and political rights, 
including the right to suffrage, which women had been pressing to attain for a 
number of years.66 A victory in her case before the Supreme Court that recog-
nized women’s citizenship rights might encompass women’s right to the fran-
chise as well.67 What Bradwell may not have foreseen was that from 1869–73, 
the protracted period during which her case was awaiting the Supreme Court’s 
decision, the political climate would become increasingly belligerent and the ac-
tual legal issues in her case would be overshadowed by the intensifying dynamics 
of Reconstruction and women’s suffrage to which they were conceptually tied.68 
Bradwell’s legal issues were substantial. The Minors’ argument from which 
she borrowed was centered on the Fourteenth Amendment, but it also drew from 
across the Constitution.69 The language of Article IV, Section Four of the Con-
stitution provided that the “United States shall guarantee to every State in this 
Union a Republican Form of Government.”70 To disenfranchised women—half 
the country’s citizens deprived of a political voice—the form of government they 
experienced, according to the Minors, was not republicanism but despotism.71 
                                                        
65  FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 164 (noting that Bradwell engaged in numerous endeavors to 
“secure occupational and professional freedom for all women”); see also NORGREN, supra 
note 52, at 40 (“Bradwell was one of several activists gamely making [the Fourteenth Amend-
ment argument framed by the Minors] and devising strategy to make it a reality.”). 
66  See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 39–40 (“The failure of the women’s movement to win . . . 
explicit inclusion of women’s rights in the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments . . . led 
Bradwell to hope that her case might result in a sweeping judicial decision supporting 
women’s status as full citizens, with all of the rights and privileges of that status.”). 
67  The reverse was also true. After the Illinois Supreme Court denied her application to the 
bar, Bradwell saw its broad adverse implications for women’s rights. See FRIEDMAN, supra 
note 14, at 21 (Bradwell wrote in her newspaper that the Illinois court’s decision to uphold 
denial of her application to the bar was “to the political rights of women in Illinois” what the 
U. S. Supreme Court’s decision in Dred Scott was “to the rights of the negroes as citizens of 
the U.S.”—“annihilation.”) (quoting Myra Bradwell, Opinion, A Woman Cannot Practice 
Law or Hold Any Office in Illinois, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Feb. 5, 1870, at 146–47). 
68  See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 107 (labeling this general time period “a most turbulent era” 
following “disunion and civil war” and the “spectacular political upheaval of Reconstruction,” 
as well as the upheaval created by women’s suffrage activism); see also DuBois, supra note 
46, at 23–32 (“By 1871 hundreds of women were trying to register and vote in dozens of towns 
all over the country,” and Susan B. Anthony was arrested and convicted for voting in 1872); 
Basch, supra note 29, at 57 (stating that in the 1870s, as the viability of women’s suffrage 
increased, its prospect “[was] met with savage derision in the press”). 
69  See Basch, supra note 29, at 59–61 (detailing the Minors’ constitutional arguments). 
70  U.S. CONST. art. IV, § 4. 
71  See Basch, supra note 29, at 61 (“Implicit here was the claim that unless public authority—
in this case the Supreme Court—reconstructed female citizenship to encompass suffrage, it 
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From this perspective, denying women political rights amounted to abandoning 
a fundamental principle of the Declaration of Independence, that “governments 
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed.”72 When Section One 
of the Fourteenth Amendment clarified that all Americans were entitled to the 
privileges or immunities of citizenship, its terms confirmed the equal rights of 
all citizens, including women, under the overall constitutional structure.73 
Drawing on this Fourteenth Amendment argument, Bradwell petitioned the 
Supreme Court to hear her case in 1870.74 Shortly thereafter, a Fourteenth 
Amendment argument similar to Bradwell’s and supportive of the rights of 
women was advanced in the November 1870 issue of Woodhull & Claflin’s 
Weekly, a newspaper published by charismatic activist Victoria Woodhull.75 In 
January 1871, Congressman Benjamin Butler of Massachusetts invited Wood-
hull to address the combined Judiciary Committees of the House and Senate 
about her interpretation of women’s constitutional rights.76 Drawing from the 
Minors’ constitutional arguments, Woodhull—the first woman to testify before 
Congress—told the assembled Congressmen that the language of Section One of 
the Fourteenth Amendment established the supremacy of national citizenship 
over state citizenship and accorded all rights of citizenship without regard to 
sex.77 Since the foremost right of citizenship was the right to vote, the Fourteenth 
Amendment secured the franchise for women, and the federal government was 
obliged to protect the franchise for all its citizens, male and female, along with 
all other civil and political rights.78 Woodhull urged Congress to pass enabling 
                                                        
had no legitimacy because it reflected not a republican form of government, but rather ‘des-
potism.’ ”). 
72  Id. (“Either we give up a fundamental principle of our government . . . that ‘governments 
derive their just powers from the consent of the governed,’ or we acknowledge the legitimacy 
of the plaintiff’s claim.”). 
73  Id. at 60 (describing the Minors’ argument that the original Constitution protected women’s 
right to vote, that women’s disenfranchisement “was the result of a monumental misreading 
of the original text,” and that the Fourteenth Amendment “merely obliterated any remaining 
doubts on the subject”). 
74  See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 116 (“The progression to the federal court in 1870 was made 
promptly after the Illinois record was prepared for transmission.”). 
75  See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 40 (“Victoria Woodhull brought this idea to the public in 
a November 19, 1870 article in her newspaper, Woodhull & Claflin’s Weekly . . . .”). 
76  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 26 (“In January of 1871 Woodhull appeared before the House 
Judiciary Committee to make the constitutional case for women’s right to vote. . . . Her ap-
pearance was sponsored by Massachusetts Republican Benjamin Butler . . . .”). 
77  Id. (“No woman had ever before been invited to address a committee of the U.S. Con-
gress. . . . Like the Minors, Woodhull argued that the Fourteenth Amendment established the 
supremacy of national over state citizenship and the obligation of the federal government to 
protect the rights of all citizens equally.”). 
78  Id. (“[W]omen along with men were citizens of the United States, and foremost among the 
‘privileges and immunities’ of national citizenship was the right to vote.”); see also Steven G. 
Calabresi & Julia T. Rickert, Originalism and Sex Discrimination, 90 TEX. L. REV. 1, 15, 70 
(2011) (observing that “[a]nyone who has equal political rights must by definition also have 
equal civil rights” because throughout American history “if a class had political rights, it would 
be guaranteed full civil rights”). 
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legislation that clarified and enforced women’s right to suffrage under the Four-
teenth Amendment.79 
When Elizabeth Cady Stanton called the Minor-Woodhull argument a “new 
departure” for the women’s suffrage movement, the constitutional interpretation 
it advanced became known as the movement’s New Departure strategy.80 Con-
gress subsequently issued two reports in response to Woodhull’s New Departure 
arguments.81 A Majority Report rejected the interpretations she had articulated, 
and a Minority Report accepted her broad vision of the Fourteenth Amendment.82 
With a significant number of supporters in Congress, suffragists began lobbying 
for adoption of the interpretations framed in the Minority Report.83 Fear of their 
potential success rallied the opposition. 
Concerned about the increasing traction of the New Departure position, in-
cluding the version before the Supreme Court in Bradwell’s case, opponents 
sought to discredit it through a not unfamiliar political tactic.84 They smeared the 
messenger, accusing Woodhull of espousing “free love”—an accusation she did 
not deny—and they cast related reputational aspersions on suffragists who allied 
with her.85 During Reconstruction, the politics of inclusionary democracy were 
sufficiently frightening to some that they resorted to extraordinary and question-
able means to hold back the forces of change.86 
While Woodhull’s position was being weakened through its association with 
defiance of sexual norms, a widespread grassroots movement, persuaded by the 
New Departure’s suffrage rhetoric, determined that women should begin voting 
                                                        
79  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 26 (stating that Woodhull “asked Congress to pass legislation 
clarifying the right of all women to vote under the new Reconstruction amendments”). 
80  See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 40 (“Elizabeth Cady Stanton declared that the Mi-
nor/Woodhull argument amounted to a ‘new departure,’ radically changing the ‘manner of 
agitation.’ The supporters of the ‘New Departure’ . . . called for a strategy of federal enabling 
legislation in support of Minor’s theory and Supreme Court decisions built on Minor’s rea-
soning.”). 
81  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 27 (“The House Judiciary Committee issued two conflicting 
reports on the constitutional issues [Woodhull] raised.”). 
82  Id. (“ ‘Thus it can be seen,’ Woodhull observed archly, ‘that equally able men differ upon 
a simple point of Constitutional Law.’ ”). 
83  Id. (“In 1871 two committee rooms in the Capitol were put at the disposal of the suffragists 
to facilitate their lobbying efforts.”). 
84  See NORGREN, supra note 52, at 40 (“Bradwell’s appeal was to be one of those [New De-
parture] high court cases.”); see also DuBois, supra note 46, at 28 (“[A]s Republicans strug-
gled over the claims of the New Departure and suffragists grew hopeful,” Woodhull’s oppo-
nents introduced “her shady sexual reputation . . . to divert attention from the constitutional 
arguments she made.”). 
85  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 28 (“Suffrage leaders allied with Woodhull were either ac-
cused of sharing her ‘free love’ sentiments or warned against the consequences of associating 
with disreputable women.”); see also CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 841–44 (describ-
ing the Woodhull “free love” scandal and its impact on the women’s suffrage movement). 
86  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14 (“The prospect of women casting the ballot, which was both 
a symbol and an instrument of independence, was troublesome to every man who feared his 
wife’s (sister’s, daughter’s, etc.) partial freedom from male control.”). 
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because their right to vote had been affirmed by the Fourteenth Amendment.87 
During this time, women sought to register to vote in many communities around 
the country.88 In some instances, groups of women showed up at the polls to cast 
ballots, their actions indicating that they saw collective qualities in individual 
rights.89 Although most election officials refused their votes, some officials were 
persuaded to register them as voters, and some accepted their ballots.90 When 
Congress passed the 1870 Enforcement Act, which allowed federal court action 
against election officials who interfered with the suffrage rights of freedmen, 
women began suing under the Enforcement Act those officials who refused to 
permit women to vote.91 Even though federal courts were typically unsympa-
thetic to these women’s lawsuits, the activists’ attempts to seize voting power 
were sounding alarms across the country.92 
This was the turbulent prelude to the issuance of the opinion in Bradwell. 
The prelude was soon to become more turbulent due to the 1872 Presidential 
election, a crisis for the Republican Party which had split into two.93 Ulysses S. 
Grant was the incumbent Republican presidential candidate, but Republicans 
concerned about accretions of federal power had formed an independent party 
and nominated for president New York publisher Horace Greeley, an avowed 
opponent of women’s rights.94 Suffragists, who like the freedman had come to 
understand that the best chance for obtaining and protecting their rights was 
through federal sources of power, campaigned for Grant, who tantalized them 
with speeches vaguely alluding to more rights for women.95 When Grant won the 
Presidency, suffragists felt that his administration would reward their efforts on 
                                                        
87  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 23–32 (describing women’s direct action voting that began 
in 1868 and increased over the next few years, not only due to the language of the Fourteenth 
Amendment, but also due to the 1870 passage of a federal statute, the Enforcement Act, that 
provided federal court remedies when election officials reject citizens’ lawful votes). 
88  Id. at 23 (“By 1871 hundreds of women were trying to register and vote in dozens of towns 
all over the country.”). 
89  Id. at 25 (“The voting women of the 1870s often went to the polls in groups.”). 
90  Id. (stating that some election officials accepted women’s votes). 
91  Id. 25–26 (reporting women’s use of the Enforcement Act in seeking authority to vote, and 
the lawsuits women filed under the Act when their votes were refused, such that “[b]y 1871 
numerous New Departure woman suffrage cases were making their way through the federal 
courts”). 
92  Id. at 29 (noting denial of the Enforcement Act claims of Sarah Spencer and seventy other 
women in the District of Columbia in an 1871 court opinion that expressed fear of the social 
and political turbulence that had already ensued following Reconstruction’s expansion of the 
franchise). 
93  Id. at 31 (describing the breakaway segment of the Republican Party in the 1872 election). 
94  Id. (explaining the negative response of women suffrage activists to Greeley’s nomination 
to run against Grant). 
95  Id. (“[M]any New Departure suffragists campaigned actively for Ulysses Grant,” whose 
Republican party “cultivated their support” and included “reference to ‘additional rights’ for 
women in their [party] platform . . . .”). 
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his behalf by granting them political and civil rights, including the right to suf-
frage.96 
This was a miscalculation. Once in office, the Republican administration 
shrunk from broad meanings of the Reconstruction Amendments.97 Deciding to 
crack down on women who had voted, federal officers arrested the most promi-
nent suffragist, Susan B. Anthony, on charges of election fraud because Anthony 
had persuaded Rochester, New York election officials to let her vote.98 In what 
appeared to be an orchestrated show trial with a pre-ordained outcome, An-
thony’s federal trial was moved out of her home county and presided over by 
Justice Ward Hunt, a recent appointee to the U.S. Supreme Court.99 Determining 
that there were no issues of fact, only of law, Hunt took the case away from the 
jury, directed a verdict of guilty—a procedure later deemed unconstitutional100—
and ordered Anthony to pay a fine.101 When Anthony refused to pay, the Grant 
administration did not prosecute her for non-payment, effectively depriving her 
of a public forum for a potential appeal to the Supreme Court.102 The message 
was clear: the federal government did not support the New Departure arguments 
for women’s suffrage.103 
It was in this ominous context that Bradwell’s New Departure case, albeit a 
non-suffrage case, would be decided by the Supreme Court. The Court had held 
                                                        
96  Id. (“[Susan B.] Anthony expected that if Republicans won, they would reward women with 
the suffrage by recognizing the New Departure claims.”). 
97  Id. at 32 (“In general, the outcome of the election cleared the way for the Republican party 
to retreat from the radical implications of the postwar amendments.”). 
98  Id. at 31 (reporting that for the 1872 Presidential election, Susan B. Anthony gathered others 
with her, went to her polling place in Rochester, New York, and persuaded local election of-
ficials to accept her vote, along with the votes of fourteen other women. Anthony was arrested 
a few weeks after the election). 
99  Id. (stating that the change of venue for her trial and the appointment of Judge Ward Hunt—
who was soon to provide the fifth vote for the majority in the Slaughter-House Cases—to 
preside over the trial served to reinforce suspicions that Anthony’s arrest and trial “had been 
authorized at the highest level of government”). 
100  See United States v. Anthony, 24 F. Cas. 829, 833 (N.D. N.Y 1873); see also CHUSED & 
WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 875 (describing Judge Hunt’s violation of the usual practice of 
sending the case to the jury and instructing them on the law). 
101  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 877 (providing a transcript of the sentencing 
hearing in which Judge Hunt fined Anthony $100 plus the costs of prosecution and Anthony 
vowed never to “pay a dollar of your unjust penalty”). Norma Basch describes Anthony’s trial 
as a “legal melodrama” and Anthony as “an eloquent martyr prodding the conscience of the 
nation.” Basch, supra note 29, at 58 (“By casting herself as a modern Joan of Arc confronting 
the full force and fury of the U.S. government, [Anthony] evoked . . . sympathy and press 
coverage . . . .”). 
102  Basch, supra note 29, at 56 (explaining that Judge Hunt’s directed verdict of guilty and the 
Grant administration’s failure to prosecute Anthony for not paying her fine “crushed An-
thony’s bid to bring her case up to the Supreme Court on appeal”). 
103  Id. at 57 (“The outcry from friends of woman suffrage over procedural irregularities, cou-
pled with the sheer political volatility of the Anthony case, may very well have pointed to the 
need for a clear and authoritative judicial resolution.”). 
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the case pending the outcome of the 1872 presidential election.104 After the elec-
tion, there were fewer political costs for Republicans in rejecting the gender jus-
tice movement’s interpretation of the Fourteenth Amendment.105 
C.   W(h)ither Privileges and Immunities? 
1.   Bradwell’s Argument 
Bradwell’s central argument was based on the unqualified language of Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment, which clarified that all Americans have 
rights as citizens that the federal and state governments must respect.106 By its 
terms, Section One forbids states from abridging the privileges or immunities of 
citizenship of all American citizens.107 Most nineteenth century thinkers under-
stood the privileges or immunities of citizenship to encompass the civil rights 
found at common law and deemed sufficiently fundamental that they belonged, 
as a matter of right, to the citizens of all free governments.108 
Under this understanding of the privileges or immunities of citizenship, 
Bradwell had a strong argument that the Fourteenth Amendment’s Privileges or 
Immunities Clause protected her right to enter a profession.109 In the 1823 case 
of Corfield v. Coryell, a citizen’s fundamental privileges or immunities included 
“[p]rotection by the government; the enjoyment of life and liberty, with the right 
to acquire and possess property . . . and to pursue and obtain happiness and safety 
. . . .”110 Corfield’s litany of the privileges or immunities of citizenship echoed 
through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which guaranteed racial equality with re-
spect to the common law rights “to make and enforce contracts, to sue, be parties, 
and give evidence, to inherit, purchase, lease, sell, hold, and convey real and 
personal property, and to full and equal benefit of all laws and proceedings for 
the security of person and property, as is enjoyed by white citizens . . . .”111 This 
                                                        
104  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 31 (“The Supreme Court held back its decision on Bradwell 
until after the election.”). 
105  Id. (“To trace the final judicial disposition of the suffragists’ constitutional arguments, we 
have to understand what was at stake in this election . . . .”). 
106  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 133–37 (1872) (stating the argument for the plaintiff 
in error, and elaborating the guarantees of the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Four-
teenth Amendment). 
107  U.S. CONST. amend. XIV, § 1 (“All persons born or naturalized in the United States . . . are 
citizens of the United States and of the State wherein they reside. No State shall make or 
enforce any law which shall abridge the privileges or immunities of citizens of the United 
States . . . .”). 
108  See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 21 (“The privileges or immunities of state citi-
zenship were common law rights . . . and the Privileges or Immunities Clause forbade the 
making of any law that abridged those rights of state citizenship.”). 
109  See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 120 (“The privileges and immunities clause of the fourteenth 
amendment opened all professions to blacks and must, [Bradwell’s attorney] argued, in the 
absence of limiting language, also extend to whites, female as well as male.”). 
110  Corfield v. Coryell, 6 F. Cas. 546, 551–52 (C.C. E.D. Pa. 1823). 
111  See Civil Rights Act of 1866, ch. 31, § 1, 14 Stat. 27. 
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language evinces the nineteenth century understanding that a central injustice of 
slavery was the denial of the fundamental right of all people to own their own 
labor and to reap its benefits by contracting for gainful employment.112 
The actions of the former Confederate states in enacting the Black Codes, 
discriminatory state statutes that denied fundamental civil rights to freed slaves, 
were rendered unlawful through the Civil Rights Act of 1866, which passed over 
President Johnson’s veto.113 To prevent a future majority from repealing the fed-
eral civil rights statute, and to prevent the U.S. Supreme Court from striking it 
down, Congress decided to constitutionalize the substance of the statute—which 
in turn had codified an aspect of common law—through the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.114 In the political bedlam that followed the Civil War, this was deemed the 
safest course.115 
 Importantly, Congress chose language for the Fourteenth Amendment that 
was more expansive than the language of the Civil Rights Act, removing its ref-
erence to race and protecting from abridgement the privileges or immunities of 
citizenship for all classes of citizens.116 This expansiveness was deliberate.117 
Congress had rejected an early draft of the Fourteenth Amendment that limited 
its prohibitions only to discrimination on the basis of race.118 This history sug-
gests that the Reconstruction Congress, while deeply concerned about racial in-
equality after slavery’s abolition, made a conscious choice to embed in the Four-
teenth Amendment a wider set of protections and a broader anti-subordination 
aim.119 
                                                        
112  See Smith, supra note 43, at 257 (arguing that the ideology underlying the Constitution’s 
three post-war amendments was “the central importance of free labor as the source of all pro-
ductive value” and that “every human being had a natural right to pursue his trade and reap 
the fruits of his labor,” making slavery “the height of injustice”). 
113  See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 27 (“Before the Fourteenth Amendment was 
introduced, the Civil Rights Act of 1866 was passed by Congress, vetoed by President Johnson 
. . . and then passed again over his veto.”). 
114  Id. (“The uncertain future of the Act was the most pressing reason for a constitutional 
amendment. The idea was to give the Civil Rights Act of 1866 a more secure constitutional 
footing and to immunize it from the attacks of future majorities in Congress. . . .”). 
115  Id. at 28 (“[S]upporters of the Civil Rights Act of 1866 feared that even if the Act initially 
survived judicial review, as a mere statute, it might be repealed by a future Democratic Con-
gress or struck down by some future Democratic Supreme Court.”). 
116  Id. at 6 (“[T]he words of the Fourteenth Amendment are general and are not confined to 
discrimination or abridgements on the basis of race.”). 
117  Id. (“The Constitution’s text alone is evidence of the Fourteenth Amendment’s broad scope 
. . . .”); id. at 16 (“[T]he Framers’ use of broad language in Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment was no accident.”). 
118  Id. at 32 (“The narrow scope of this proposed race discrimination version of the Fourteenth 
Amendment caused the draft to be rejected . . . by members of Congress on the left who wanted 
to prohibit all forms of caste . . .”). 
119  Id. at 19 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s legislative history in Congress and the ratifying 
state legislatures confirms that the inclusion of language at a high level of generality was pur-
poseful and was understood to be addressed to a broad problem. This history reveals that Sec-
tion One was understood to ban class legislation and systems of caste . . . .”). 
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As a matter of constitutional right, the Fourteenth Amendment applied to all 
classes of citizens, who were understood to be equal classes before the law, ex-
tending across generations a principle of equality writ large.120 The Amendment 
authorized federal power to invalidate discriminatory state laws and practices, 
including those that treated whole classes of people as less than full citizens.121 
Bradwell had reason to believe that the Fourteenth Amendment, interpreted in 
light of this history, protected her right to a law license as a privilege of citizen-
ship accorded equally to all qualified applicants and that the Supreme Court had 
constitutional grounds to overturn the state court’s refusal to issue her license 
because of her membership in a class defined by gender.122 
2.   Analysis of the Argument 
Unfortunately for those seeking equality, the Court retreated from the struc-
tural innovations of the postwar Constitution.123 This became apparent when the 
Court decided the Slaughter-House Cases on the day before Bradwell.124 In con-
struing the Fourteenth Amendment to uphold a monopoly on the slaughtering 
business created by the Louisiana legislature and rejecting the challenge of a 
group of independent butchers whose businesses were impaired by the statutorily 
created monopoly, the Slaughter-House Court disregarded popular understand-
ings of the Amendment and the common law, constricting beyond recognition 
the apparent meaning of the privileges and immunities of citizenship granted un-
qualifiedly to all American citizens.125 Diverging from popular understandings 
                                                        
120  See EPPS, supra note 32, at 164–66 (“The Fourteenth [Amendment] begins by throwing a 
national aegis of protection over all. . . . The tone of [Section One of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment is] inclusive, universal, and comprehensive.”). 
121  See Smith, supra note 43, at 259 (elaborating the post-war legal argument that “the [Re-
construction] amendments had decisively repudiated the states’ rights . . . views of citizenship 
prevalent in the antebellum South, rendering national citizenship unquestionably primary” and 
“based on the liberal commitment to securing fundamental rights against all threats, including 
any from the states”). 
122  Bradwell stated that she filed suit not to gain admission to the bar but to vindicate the 
Fourteenth Amendment’s broad principle of equality. See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 115 (stat-
ing that Bradwell believed “liberty of pursuit was guaranteed to every citizen by the fourteenth 
amendment, under laws which should operate equally upon all”) (quoting Myra Bradwell, The 
XIV Amendment and Our Case, CHI. LEGAL NEWS, Apr. 19, 1873, at 354). 
123  See EPPS, supra note 32, at 169 (“That decision was not based on what the Constitution 
said so much as it was on the idea that the Framers could not have really meant what they 
said.”). 
124  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 81–83 (1872) (narrowly construing the protections of 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment in holding that a Louisiana 
statute granting a corporate slaughterhouse monopoly did not violate plaintiffs’—a group of 
independent butchers’—right to a livelihood). 
125  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 866 (asserting that in the Slaughter-House 
Cases, the Court found that “[r]ather than being an expansive repository of new federal rights 
as many had hoped, the [Privileges or Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment] just 
gave to blacks the pre-existing [limited national rights of citizenship] held by whites”); see 
17 NEV. L.J. 565, GOLDFARB - FINAL.DOCX 5/10/17  12:11 PM 
Summer 2017] EQUALITY WRIT LARGE 585 
of the privileges or immunities of citizenship, the opinion drained the lifeblood 
from the clause, “placed first among section one’s grand restraints on govern-
ment,” soon after its birth.126 
Ignoring the longstanding common law meaning of privileges and immuni-
ties as fundamental civil rights—including the right to a vocation—and ignoring 
the Fourteenth Amendment’s authorization of federal power to prevent states 
from interfering with those rights, the Slaughter-House majority, voting five to 
four, stated that the Amendment’s privileges or immunities guarantee applied 
only to those rights affecting a citizen’s relationship with the federal government 
not the states.127 Whereas Congress had designed the Fourteenth Amendment to 
restrict a state’s authority to maintain subordinate classes—including subordi-
nate labor classes—and some of its drafters and ratifiers might have identified 
constitutional infirmities under the Fourteenth Amendment of a state’s attempt 
to exclude a class of people from a vocation, the Supreme Court’s majority did 
not.128 This context—and other contexts emerging from the federal government’s 
retreat from Reconstruction’s legal protections—provides support for the propo-
sition that in the late nineteenth century, the Supreme Court betrayed the Four-
teenth Amendment’s new promises.129 
The obvious need to reorganize the operation of government after the Civil 
War had led to a bold restructuring of the Constitution’s design, one that explic-
itly recalibrated the relationship between citizen and state and between state and 
federal power.130 But seeing the extent of societal change that the Fourteenth 
Amendment might support, in the highly charged atmosphere that followed its 
adoption, some Congressmen lost their nerve, their taste for change, or both.131 
                                                        
also EPPS, supra note 32, at 166 (“The striking thing about . . . Section One of the Fourteenth 
Amendment . . . is that it carefully does not limit any of its concepts to any racial group.”). 
126  See Philip B. Kurland, The Privileges or Immunities Clause: “Its Hour Come Round at 
Last”?, 1972 WASH. U. L.Q. 405, 406, 413 (1972) (“Unique among constitutional provisions, 
the privileges and immunities clause of the Fourteenth Amendment enjoys the distinction of 
having been rendered a ‘practical nullity’ by a single decision of the Supreme Court rendered 
within five years after its ratification.”) (quoting THE CONSTITUTION OF THE UNITED STATES OF 
AMERICA 965 (Edward S. Corwin ed., 1953); see also BAER, supra note 28, at 259 (asserting 
that “[t]he [Slaughter-House] decision effectively killed the privileges-and-immunities 
clause” and the Court “has not overextended the [fourteenth] amendment; it has shackled it”). 
127  Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 78 (1872) (stating that the Court would not interpret 
the Fourteenth Amendment to impose federal rights on the states, because it would “fetter and 
degrade” the states and “it radically changes the whole theory of the relations of the State and 
Federal governments to each other and of both these governments to the people”). 
128  See Smith, supra note 43, at 258 (“[T]he Supreme Court read the Thirteenth and Fourteenth 
Amendments very narrowly, overruling interpretations grounded in the free labor ideology of 
the governing Republican Party, out of an explicit concern to prevent the amendments from 
interfering extensively with traditional state prerogatives.”). 
129  See EPPS, supra note 32, at 169 (“The Fourteenth Amendment clearly changes something. 
Courts have been stuck with the ‘federal rights only’ reading . . . .”). 
130  Id. at 167 (“[T]he Fourteenth Amendment revolutionizes the membership of the American 
Republic. . . . [then] radically alters its nature.”). 
131  See supra notes 81–82 and accompanying text. 
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In other words, it was not just the Court that re-interpreted the original protective 
scope of the Fourteenth Amendment within a few years after its ratification.132 
Many decisionmakers balked at the boldness and breadth of the text of the laws 
enacted in the early days of Reconstruction.133 
When they balked, does that mean they altered or limited the original mean-
ing of the Fourteenth Amendment? Although that is a matter of interpretive phi-
losophy, it seems entirely fair to respond in the negative. The meaning of the text 
does not change simply because its authors and ratifiers did not anticipate or 
approve some of the applications of the text.134 Therefore, even though the ap-
plication to women’s suffrage was one that some of the Fourteenth Amendment’s 
ratifiers did not consider and did not relish, it cannot be denied that broad and 
expansive words have broad and expansive applications in relevant situations, 
even those not specifically envisioned by those who wrote and approved the 
words.135 As Professor Stephen Calabresi has observed: “[W]e are governed by 
the constitutional law that the Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment wrote and 
not by the unenacted opinions that its members held. . . . [S]ex discrimination is 
precisely the kind of discrimination prohibited by the Fourteenth Amendment 
. . . .”136 
After unleashing the democratic, egalitarian principles of Section One of the 
Fourteenth Amendment, many Republicans sought to control how those princi-
ples applied in specific situations.137 Bradwell’s attorney, Matthew Hale Carpen-
ter—a U.S. Senator, constitutional lawyer, and rising star in the Republican 
                                                        
132  See Smith, supra note 43, at 261 (stating that the Court’s narrow interpretations of the 
Fourteenth Amendment “prevailed only by working in alliance with republican concerns for 
states’ rights”). 
133  Id. (stating that decisionmakers preferred arguments that “permitted them simply to defer 
to the states, instead of explicitly endorsing hierarchical views,” enabling them to “evade, ra-
ther than directly oppose, the liberal claims of basic human rights that the ‘free labor’ ideology 
of the amendments clearly advanced”). 
134  See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 3 (“[I]t does not follow that the original meaning 
of a clause or text is defined by the Framers’ original expected applications.”); see also 
CHARLES FAIRMAN, HISTORY OF THE SUPREME COURT OF THE UNITED STATES, VOL. VI: 
RECONSTRUCTION AND REUNION, 1864–88, PART ONE 1301 (1971) (“[T]he particular applica-
tion with which a general provision was identified at the outset should not so limit its future 
operation as to produce a public inconvenience—notably when this would deny that perfect 
equality of rights among citizens which the Constitution contemplates.”). 
135  See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 48 (“The Fourteenth Amendment’s creators 
knew well that their Amendment, once adopted, could be applied in ways contrary to their 
expectations . . . .”). 
136  Id. at 9, 14. 
137  See FAIRMAN, supra note 134, at 281–85 (providing a letter written by Justice Miller to a 
relative in Texas that describes Republican efforts to control the scope of the Fourteenth 
Amendment); see also Smith, supra note 43, at 262 (observing that the Court “deferred to the 
state’s republican powers of self-governance, in order to appear to confer equal citizenship 
nationally while acquiescing in the creation of second-class citizens by the states”). 
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Party—was among them.138 Disturbingly, Carpenter who argued for a broad un-
derstanding of the Fourteenth Amendment in Bradwell had also been engaged 
by the state of Louisiana to argue for a narrow understanding of the Fourteenth 
Amendment in Slaughter-House.139 Whether it was despite or because of this 
obvious conflict, Carpenter also imposed limits on his broad argument for Four-
teenth Amendment protections in Bradwell.140 He told the Court that granting 
women like Bradwell the right under the Fourteenth Amendment to pursue a 
chosen vocation did not necessarily entail granting them the right to suffrage.141 
Carpenter’s actions, manifesting an intolerable ethical conflict under current 
professional standards,142 may represent the Republican Party’s determined ef-
forts in the late nineteenth century to navigate volatile postwar politics and the 
meaning of the Fourteenth Amendment in ways perceived to best advance Re-
publicans’ political standing and control.143 The patriarchal imagery of privileged 
men making self-serving choices purporting to protect women’s interests pre-
sents an ironic backdrop to the substance of the gender equality arguments raised 
in Bradwell’s case.144 It is unclear whether Carpenter consulted Bradwell and 
obtained her consent to his assuming a conflicted legal stance and drawing lines 
within his Fourteenth Amendment argument in Bradwell.145 Suffragists were an-
gered by Carpenter’s manipulation of Bradwell’s New Departure claims to un-
dermine the women’s suffrage position.146 
                                                        
138  See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 116 (“Forty-five years old, eight years at the Supreme Court 
Bar, and a freshman Senator, Carpenter was one of the more famous American attorneys of 
that time. . . . He was an acknowledged authority on constitutional issues . . . .”). 
139  Id. at 118 (“While his theme in Bradwell’s case was the broad language of the amendment, 
Carpenter’s argument on behalf of the monopoly slaughterhouse must have stressed the unin-
tended ‘startling consequences’ of an expansive reading of the amendment’s language.”). 
140  Id. at 120 (noting that Carpenter saw the language of the Reconstruction Amendments as 
distinguishing the right to vote from privileges and immunities). 
141  Id. (“[Carpenter] emphatically disassociated Bradwell’s quest for admission to the bar from 
the campaign for women’s suffrage . . . .”). 
142  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 865 (“[L]awyers today could not simultane-
ously represent clients with such obviously opposing interests in the same court at the same 
time.”). 
143  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 39 n.47 (arguing that Carpenter’s arguments in Slaughter-
House and Bradwell, including his argument to exclude suffrage from the privileges and im-
munities of citizenship, while appearing to be inconsistent, were actually consistent to the 
extent of “Carpenter’s determination, on behalf of the Republican leadership, to control and 
limit the breadth of the Fourteenth Amendment”). 
144  See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 131 (“[We cannot] know the effect of Carpenter’s conflicting 
stances on the Court’s decision.”). 
145  In December, 1871, Bradwell wrote to Carpenter asking about the progress of her case, 
and Carpenter replied with a sloppy note in mid-January indicating that the oral argument 
would be the next day—before she received his reply. See id. at 119 (“Evidently it was difficult 
for Bradwell to stay in touch with her attorney at such a long distance . . . . Apparently, Car-
penter had made his plans without any counsel from his client. In any event, he sent her a copy 
of the brief only after it was submitted to the Court.”). 
146  See FRIEDMAN, supra note 14, at 22–23 (“Carpenter’s position in Bradwell’s case infuriated 
many suffragists, particularly Susan B. Anthony, who wrote indignantly to Myra: ‘Carpenter’s 
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At the same time, Carpenter’s strategic judgment about the strongest posture 
for Bradwell’s case—if made through a consultative process—was not wholly 
indefensible. In the nineteenth century, the argument that the privileges or im-
munities of citizenship encompassed the right to practice a vocation was stronger 
than the argument that they encompassed women’s suffrage.147 The right to enter 
contracts to receive the benefits of one’s own labor had long been a principal 
understanding of what the privileges and immunities of citizenship meant.148 The 
distinction that Carpenter was drawing was between civil and political rights, a 
common dichotomy of nineteenth century thought.149 Having constitutionalized 
the Civil Rights Act of 1866 and applied it to all classes of Americans, the Four-
teenth Amendment, even when construed narrowly, should have protected at 
least Bradwell’s civil right to choose a trade and enter a profession.150 
Yet the political and legal connection between Bradwell’s New Departure 
argument and the New Departure arguments of the women’s suffrage movement 
likely impeded Bradwell’s chances of success.151 In the 1870s, the atmosphere 
surrounding women suffrage was polarized and fractious.152 Even though nine-
teenth century jurists distinguished between civil and political rights, they knew 
that upholding constitutional protection of women’s civil rights would lay help-
ful groundwork for a subsequent constitutional claim that the Fourteenth Amend-
ment protected women’s ultimate political right to exercise the franchise.153 Un-
willing to lend that incremental assistance, the Court deemed Bradwell’s 
compelling civil rights argument to fall short.154 
                                                        
argument was such a school boy pettifogging speech—wholly without a basic principle . . . .’ 
”). 
147  See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 11 (“The category of civil rights is broader and 
more inclusive than the category of political rights.”). 
148  Id. at 71–72 (asserting that the common-law rights incorporated into the Civil Rights Act 
of 1866, including the right to make contracts and hold property, were understood “by the 
Framers of the Fourteenth Amendment to shed light on the meaning of that Amendment’s 
Privileges or Immunities Clause”). 
149  Id. at 71 (“[I]n the nineteenth century, it was widely accepted that there was a difference 
between political and civil rights, including by members of Congress.”). 
150  Id. at 6–7 (“Any law that discriminates or abridges civil rights to set up a hereditary caste 
system violates the command of Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment.”). 
151  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 30 (“Bradwell’s case was closely watched by suffragists as 
an indication of how much support to expect from the Republican Party.”); see also CHUSED 
& WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 871 (“Bradwell’s attorney, Matthew Carpenter, spent a great 
deal of time in his argument before the Supreme Court trying to convince the Justices that her 
case was not a stalking horse for the suffrage movement.”); id. at 857 (“In many ways, 
[Bradwell’s] case encapsulated the history of the post-War suffrage movement.”). 
152  See supra notes 80–105 and accompanying text; see also Basch, supra note 29, at 57 
(“Although the prospect of woman suffrage still met with savage derision in the press, it was 
a viable reality.”). 
153  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 30 (reporting Elizabeth Cady Stanton’s view of the Bradwell 
case that “if women were covered along with men under the Fourteenth Amendment, wasn’t 
the fundamental point of equal rights won?”). 
154  See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 60 (indicating that in Bradwell, the Court “man-
aged to resist the Amendment’s full scope”). 
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Perversely, the wide scope of the Fourteenth Amendment’s terms may con-
stitute an important part of the reason that nineteenth century decisionmakers 
engaged in concerted—even if legally questionable—efforts to apply its inclu-
sive vision stingily. Undoing the hierarchies of the past is especially difficult 
when all of those charged with the mechanisms of undoing must undo their own 
hierarchical positions in the process. Standing at the top rungs of the hierarchies 
of race and gender that were being challenged, it is no surprise that the feet of 
Reconstruction era decisionmakers turned cold once the accompanying claims 
of women and African-Americans revealed the extent to which true equality 
would reallocate social power.155 
Gender ideology, in particular, may have played a key role in turning deci-
sionmakers’ feet cold and undercutting the Fourteenth Amendment’s promise. 
The activism of women who read the Fourteenth Amendment as making them 
fully autonomous political citizens startled those—like many of the judges and 
members of Congress—whose entire lives, public and private, were thoroughly 
structured around the nineteenth century’s gender ideology of separate 
spheres.156 The prospect of upheaval in the gender relations that organized their 
lives may have combined with other concerns to lead decisionmakers away from 
a robust understanding of the universal language of the Fourteenth Amend-
ment.157 
Justice Bradley’s infamous concurring opinion in Bradwell, joined by Jus-
tices Field and Swayne, supports this understanding.158 Bradley, Field, and 
Swayne had been proponents of a capacious reading of the Privileges or Immun-
ities Clause in Slaughter-House but could not sustain their broad reading in 
Bradwell.159 An explanation of this inconsistency lies in a commitment to status 
quo gender relations, even though these three Justices—unlike the majority of 
                                                        
155  See BAER, supra note 28, at 111 (describing the “incredulous tone” of the privileges and 
immunities decisions, which implied that “surely the authors of the Fourteenth Amendment 
could not have intended to change the world quite this much. The Court did not entertain the 
possibility that drastic fundamental change was just what the authors had intended.”). 
156  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 893–94 (observing that “longstanding opposi-
tion to suffrage . . . tapped into a powerful strain of antagonism in late nineteenth century 
America to the demand by public feminists that women be treated as individuals fully equal 
to men”). 
157  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 30 (reporting Victoria Woodhull’s concern that “women 
might be admitted to the benefits of the postwar amendments only to find those amendments 
so narrowed that they bestowed virtually nothing”). 
158  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 139–42 (1872) (Bradley, J., concurring) (asserting 
that the right to a vocation is not one of the privileges or immunities of women’s citizenship, 
because “nature herself, has always recognized a wide difference in the respective spheres and 
destinies of man and woman”). 
159  See Gilliam, supra note 60, at 126 (“In a concurring opinion, joined by Justices Swayne 
and Field, Justice Bradley set forth his own reasons why the Illinois judgment should not be 
disturbed. . . . Men and women moved in different spheres due to the natural differences in 
their respective abilities.”). 
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the Court—expressed a willingness to use the Fourteenth Amendment, as in-
tended, to strike down discriminatory state practices and alter the status quo in 
American race relations in states across the country.160 
The intellectual challenge of maintaining law’s resistance to equality for 
women and African-Americans multiplied significantly after the Civil War, once 
equality became constitutionally required by the Fourteenth Amendment.161 But 
a judiciary composed entirely of privileged white men did what it could to rise 
to that difficult challenge.162 They sustained their resistance for decade upon dec-
ade.163 
The reasons to have waited until the mid-to-late twentieth century to outlaw 
Jim Crow and Jane Crow are not found in law but perhaps in fear—fear of the 
implications of unsettling status quo hierarchies by those who most benefitted 
from them. White men in black robes grasped at arguments—many of them fairly 
meager—that left white women and African-Americans subject to virulent dis-
crimination of many kinds.164 Indeed, the twentieth century’s civil rights’ move-
ments were organized in significant part around concerns that courts had spent 
decades taking away from African-Americans, women, and other subordinated 
people the entitlements and protections that the Fourteenth Amendment had 
given.165 The Civil Rights movements of the mid-to-late twentieth century ulti-
mately generated a second Reconstruction, at least in formal law, moving the 
                                                        
160  See Slaughter-House Cases, 83 U.S. 36, 83–130 (1872) (Field, J., dissenting) (stating that 
the drafters and ratifiers of the Fourteenth Amendment intended that the Privileges or Immun-
ities Clause protect the fundamental rights of citizens, including the right to lawful employ-
ment, from deprivation by the states). 
161  See Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 78, at 16 (“Any person reading these clauses [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] for the first time would immediately conclude that they mandate, in 
some sense, ‘equality before the law.’”). 
162  See Hernàndez-Truyol, supra note 5, at 41 (reporting that when Jimmy Carter became 
President in 1977, “there were only eight women on the federal bench, with only one out of 
ninety-seven on federal courts of appeal, making women less than 1 percent of the total federal 
judiciary”). 
163  See BAER, supra note 28, at 283 (“Over the years, those [lavish Fourteenth Amendment] 
guarantees have shrunk, as Congress has rarely enforced them and the courts have timidly 
construed them.”). 
164  Id. at 105 (“The [Fourteenth Amendment’s] lavish grant of liberty and equality was nar-
rowed into a guarantee of a few rights that were not, in fact, protected . . . .”). 
165  Id. at 111–12 (arguing that due to narrow court decisions that “prevailed as law, though 
increasingly shaky law, until 1954. . . . the United States remained a society of racism [and 
sexism] under law, almost as if the Civil War amendments had never been passed”). 
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country from Bradwell v. Illinois166 to Reed v. Reed167 and from Plessy v. Fergu-
son168 to Brown v. Board of Education.169 While these were welcome legal de-
velopments, the second Reconstruction, like its nineteenth century counterpart, 
has shown considerable vulnerability.170 
III.   LEARNING FROM LOSS 
A.   Radical Inclusion 
How should contemporary feminist thought take account of the interconnec-
tions between the anti-subordination movements of women and African-Ameri-
cans and the legal theories they espoused? What lessons emerge from the equal-
ity struggles and defeats of the nineteenth century?171 What do these struggles 
and outcomes teach us about the prospects and mechanisms for challenging sub-
ordination? 
While these questions cannot yield straightforward answers, I start with a 
suggestion that the overlap in the history of the struggles for race and gender 
justice lends support to a radically inclusive feminist theory.172 As a correlate, 
the overlap suggests that feminist principles, while speaking directly to structures 
                                                        
166  See Bradwell v. Illinois, 83 U.S. 130, 138–39 (1872) (holding that a state’s denial of a 
woman’s right to a vocation does not violate her privileges or immunities of citizenship under 
the Fourteenth Amendment). 
167  See Reed v. Reed, 404 U.S. 71, 75–77 (1971) (holding that a state statute automatically 
preferring men over women as estate administrators is an arbitrary legislative classification 
that violates the Fourteenth Amendment’s Equal Protection Clause). 
168  Plessy v. Ferguson, 163 U.S. 537 (1896) (upholding under the Fourteenth Amendment 
racial segregation in railway transportation). 
169  Brown v. Bd. of Educ., 347 U.S. 483 (1954) (holding that school segregation imposed by 
the dominant group on racial minorities violates the Fourteenth Amendment). 
170  See MANNING MARABLE, RACE, REFORM, AND REBELLION vii–viii (2007) (comparing the 
civil rights and black power movements of the 1950s and 1960s to Reconstruction, and high-
lighting the historical events in each era that led to the “continuous reality of black stigmati-
zation, exclusion, and marginalization” that has “revers[ed] blacks’ hopes for a more inclusive, 
democratic, racially just society”); see also BAER, supra note 28, at 106 (countering those who 
suggest that “if the Court initially narrowed the Fourteenth Amendment, since 1954 it has 
enlarged it beyond recognition” by observing that the Court’s Fourteenth Amendment inter-
pretations remain “stingy and niggling”). 
171  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 845 (“Ignoring what is painful in woman suf-
frage history diminishes the capacity to build on its strengths by learning from past mis-
takes.”). 
172  See Basch, supra note 29, at 52 (“[I]n the thoughts and actions of reformers, the constitu-
tional avenues for ameliorating sexism and racism have run along closely related lines, and 
perhaps nowhere more so than in the post-Civil War era.”); Calabresi & Rickert, supra note 
78, at 53 (observing that while “[i]t would be an exaggeration to suggest that the position of 
white women and slaves” was nearly the same, “[t]he point is that both groups had their op-
tions in life curtailed by law, making their abilities, merits, and desires irrelevant, and leaving 
them to some degree at the mercy of the [white] men who benefited from their unpaid labor”). 
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of gender, cannot be confined within gender borders.173 In fairness, this is not the 
only reading of the nineteenth century struggles recounted here, as historical 
events like these contain multiple contradictory meanings. Nonetheless, it is pos-
sible to identify in the history of the nineteenth century’s struggles for equality 
the seeds of an intersectional feminism centered on women’s multidimensional 
identities and challenges to subordination in all its forms.174 
Contrary arguments are supportable as well. For example, although the over-
lap between the nineteenth century racial justice and gender justice movements 
was considerable, there were times when historical events drove them apart.175 
In particular, fissures developed between the gender justice and racial justice 
movements when African-American men were enfranchised during Reconstruc-
tion and women were not, disrupting the solidarity that had prevailed through 
wartime.176 One unfortunate result is that some suffragists opposed the Four-
teenth and Fifteenth Amendments for supporting the enfranchisement of Afri-
can-American men but not women of any race or class.177 This opposition sev-
ered the women’s rights movement, with a faction of suffragists supporting the 
passage of the Fourteenth and Fifteenth Amendments (in particular, those affili-
ated with the American Woman Suffrage Association) and another faction op-
posing it (in particular, those—like Elizabeth Cady Stanton and Susan B. An-
thony—affiliated with the National Woman Suffrage Association).178 The 
accompanying arguments about Reconstruction constitutionalism made by some 
women’s rights activists contributed to a perception that the women’s movement 
was concerned primarily with the lives of privileged white women.179 
                                                        
173  See Smith, supra note 43, at 255 (“The antebellum era . . . witness[ed] the rise of a staunchly 
egalitarian and liberal women’s movement, triggered by the abolitionist crusade and its revi-
talization of the ideals of the Declaration of Independence.”). 
174  See Stanchi, Berger, & Crawford,  supra note 3, at 21 (“Beyond the recognition of multiple 
forms of oppression, intersectionality provides a theoretical framework through which the law 
can recognize and remedy those multiple oppressions instead of forcing a case into one dis-
tilled category of discrimination.”). 
175  See Basch, supra note 29, at 53 (“It was to these flexible, indeterminate promises [of the 
Fourteenth Amendment] that the radical wing of the women’s movement committed itself, 
even as it contested the ratification of the amendment, jettisoning its old abolitionist ties and 
setting the campaigns against sexism and racism at odds with each other.”). 
176  See Smith, supra note 43, at 257 (“[A]bolitionism and women’s rights diverged because 
many women refused to subordinate their claims to those of the freedmen, a subordination 
evident in the failure of the postwar amendments to address female concerns explicitly.”). 
177  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 20 (“Most histories of women’s rights . . . have emphasized 
the initial rage of women’s rights leaders at the Radical Republican authors of the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth amendments,” first for including the word “male” in Section Two of the Four-
teenth Amendment “defin[ing] the basis of congressional representation” and then for exclud-
ing sex from the “prohibited disfranchisements” of the Fifteenth Amendment). 
178  See Smith, supra note 43, at 257–58 (describing the split between the National and the 
American Associations of Woman Suffrage); see also CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 
830–45 (same). 
179  See GIDDINGS, supra note 31, at 66 (detailing the racist rhetoric in The Revolution, the 
newspaper of Stanton and Anthony, when discussing issues of women’s suffrage during the 
postwar period). 
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To my mind, these contrary interpretations do not undermine the fundamen-
tal insight that anti-subordination movements are interdependent and that anti-
subordination arguments necessarily cross boundaries from particular socially 
defined categories into others. Understandably, suffragists who had fought for 
years for women’s right to vote were disappointed that the Reconstruction 
Amendments did not address women’s enfranchisement in so many words.180 
But surely the needs for federal protection of freed slaves, male and female, who 
were already experiencing brutal discrimination in the Confederate states and 
beyond, were acute.181 Opposing these protections because they were incomplete 
seemed, at the very least, insensitive to a profound and substantial issue of justice 
as well as self-undermining of the related anti-subordination arguments that 
women continued to need to promote. 
Given this interdependence, the opposition of some women activists to the 
Reconstruction Amendments produced unintended negative consequences.182 
Not only did it split and thereby weaken the women’s suffrage movement, it 
generated an uncomfortable posture for those who had opposed the Fourteenth 
and Fifteenth Amendments for failing to enfranchise women in explicit terms 
when they later found themselves arguing—with ample justification—that Sec-
tion One of the Fourteenth Amendment had enfranchised them nonetheless.183 
Supporting from the outset any available anti-subordination tools—as some of 
the suffragists did—served to promote solidarity across anti-subordination 
movements, generate intersectional understandings, and strengthen the theory 
and practice of equality writ large.184 
                                                        
180  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 811 (describing the outrage of women suffra-
gists that Section Two of the Fourteenth Amendment “enshrined male voting privileges in the 
Constitution for the first time”). 
181  At an 1869 suffrage convention, Frederick Douglass powerfully expressed this view: 
When women, because they are women, are hunted down through the cities of New York and 
New Orleans, when they are dragged from their houses and hung upon lamp posts . . . when they 
are objects of insult and outrage at every turn; when they are in danger of having their homes burnt 
down over their heads; when their children are not allowed to enter schools; then they will have 
an urgency to obtain the ballot equal to our own. 
GIDDINGS, supra note 31, at 67 (quoting 2 HISTORY OF WOMAN SUFFRAGE 382 (Elizabeth Cady 
Stanton et al. eds., 1887)). 
182  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 845 (“Mainstream suffragists in the American 
wing—the overwhelming majority—found the anti-Fifteenth Amendment campaign not only 
politically unwise, but morally repugnant.”). 
183  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 21 (“After the Fifteenth Amendment was finally ratified, the 
suffragists . . . shifted from the claim that the Reconstruction amendments excluded women 
and began to argue instead that they were broad enough to include women’s rights along with 
those of the freedmen.”). 
184  See Andrea Moore Kerr, White Women’s Rights, Black Men’s Wrongs, Free Love, Black-
mail, and the Formation of the American Woman Suffrage Association, in ONE WOMAN, ONE 
VOTE 61, 71 (Marjorie Spruill Wheeler ed., 1995) (quoting a letter from Lucy Stone expressing 
the concern that “[i]t is not true that our movement is opposed to the negro. But it will be very 
easy to make it so, to the mutual harm of both causes”). 
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Of course, political dynamics played a significant role in driving a wedge 
between the anti-subordination movements of the nineteenth century.185 When 
decisionmakers recognized in the roomy language of the Fourteenth Amendment 
the civil and political rights of African-American men—at least at first and at 
least in principle—but refused the inclusion of women in that large constitutional 
vision, they disrupted the linkages that promoted easy solidarity between the two 
movements.186 Time and again, decisionmakers refused to see women’s equality 
claims among the entitlements of all Americans, pushing the women’s move-
ment away from their early intersectional arguments about the equality rights of 
all.187 
After numerous crushing blows, including Bradwell, women retreated from 
their intersectional equality claims under the Fourteenth Amendment and devel-
oped another species of argumentation.188 They began asserting, for example, 
that women’s differences from men made them especially important contributors 
to political life.189 Difference arguments, such as those that underlay the emer-
gence of cultural feminism, gained more political traction and helped women 
achieve political equality through the Nineteenth Amendment, ratified at long 
last in 1920.190 
Necessity may well have played a role in inventing the politics of difference 
feminism.191 But it moved activists away from mid-to-late nineteenth century ef-
forts to emphasize the similarities between women’s struggles for equality and 
                                                        
185  CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 834 (describing the anti-black Democratic Party’s 
pretense of supporting women’s suffrage in 1866, in an effort to split the suffrage movement 
on racial grounds). 
186  Id. at 811 (“The decision of most prominent male abolitionists in and out of Congress to 
support the Fourteenth Amendment outraged a number of women suffragists” because Section 
Two tied congressional representation to the number of male voters). 
187  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 19 (describing the value of the women suffrage movement’s 
initial universal arguments about equality in helping to “situate women’s emancipation in the 
larger context of humanity’s freedom”). 
188  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 888 (“Given the religious, domestic violence, 
and morality issues inherent in the temperance movement, it was not surprising that the equal-
ity-based rhetoric of the abolitionist movement and segments of the post-Civil War suffrage 
movement ebbed away to be replaced by arguments about the special roles women could play 
in politics.”). 
189  Id. (describing “the growth of arguments for suffrage based on the higher moral standing 
of women in American society,” an argument that “men began to accept” as “a basis for ex-
tending suffrage”). 
190  For an historical analysis of the ratification of the Nineteenth Amendment and the conserv-
atism of some of the arguments in support of it, see generally Reva B. Siegel, She the People: 
The Nineteenth Amendment, Sex Equality, Federalism, and the Family, 115 HARV. L. REV. 
947 (2002). 
191  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 19 (“Here, in the post-Civil War years, we can see proponents 
of women’s rights as they move from universal to particularistic arguments, providing us with 
the Gilded Age equivalent of the shift from ‘equality’ to ‘difference’ in the feminism of our 
own time.”). 
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all struggles for equality.192 The nineteenth century’s intersectional approach had 
focused on devising legal strategies to develop generous constitutional interpre-
tations, aided by the new Fourteenth Amendment’s equality provisions.193 Be-
cause women’s rights activists did not succeed in this endeavor in the first wave 
of feminism, the inverse became true.194 A miserly approach to Fourteenth 
Amendment interpretation emerged from their litigation, with negative conse-
quences for all who identified with any equality struggle.195 
Indeed, there were cascading consequences of Bradwell. If a desire to protect 
status quo power structures, including structures of gender, had provoked deci-
sionmaking men to retreat from the apparent meaning of the privileges and im-
munities of citizenship protected by Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, 
the retreat could not stop there.196 Once the retreat had begun, a narrowed under-
standing of the Fourteenth Amendment adversely affected other Fourteenth 
Amendment claimants.197 Unfortunately, African-Americans suffered pro-
foundly from the justice system’s constitutional retreat, as an enfeebled Four-
teenth Amendment was not a sufficiently powerful basis for the federal protec-
tion that they desperately needed from the discriminatory commitments of the 
former Confederate states.198 
B.   Strategic Choices 
These events counsel caution about the limits of legal strategies.199 Yet, 
while it would have been foolhardy for subordinated groups to place their fate 
                                                        
192  See Smith, supra note 43, at 264 (“Egalitarian views did not completely disappear from 
the woman’s movement, but they became less prominent.”). 
193  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 27 (“[D]ebate over the feminists’ particular constitutional 
arguments was inseparable from questions of the larger meaning of the Reconstruction amend-
ments.”). 
194  Id. at 34 (“With the defeat of the New Departure, winning the vote for women was no 
longer tied to an overall democratic interpretation of the Constitution.”). 
195  Id. at 29 (“[D]enying women the rights they claimed under general provisions weakened 
those provisions in general.”). 
196  See Smith, supra note 43, at 231 (noting the dynamics that led to legal decisions which 
“buttressed the social composition and hierarchies preferred by more established citizens—
denials of citizenship, or conferral of second-class citizenship, on women and minorities in 
ways that liberalism should logically have opposed”). 
197  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 32 (“There is a link between the judicial dismissal of the 
feminists’ New Departure and the larger repudiation of the postwar amendments.”). 
198  See id. at 33 (“The rejection of woman suffrage arguments on the grounds that the Fifteenth 
Amendment was only intended to forbid disenfranchisement by race paved the way for a read-
ing of the Fifteenth Amendment that was so narrow it did not even protect the freedmen them-
selves.”). 
199  The indeterminacy of legal doctrine allows it to be interpreted progressively or regres-
sively, such that legal reform is limited in its capacity to undermine subordination. See Kim-
berlé Williams Crenshaw, Race, Reform, and Retrenchment: Transformation and Legitimation 
in Antidiscrimination Law, 101 HARV. L. REV. 1331, 1335 (1988) (“The civil rights commu-
nity . . . must come to terms with the fact that antidiscrimination discourse is fundamentally 
ambiguous and can accommodate conservative as well as liberal views of race and equality. . . . 
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entirely into the hands of legal decisionmakers who were drawn exclusively from 
dominant groups disinclined to identify and recognize their justice claims, it 
would also have been foolhardy to abandon legal avenues, especially in the cli-
mate of profound political and legal transformation that followed the Civil 
War.200 One critical meaning of subordination is that the disempowered are gen-
erally addressing their appeals to those who, unlike them, are empowered to de-
cide.201 As fraught and challenging as legal strategies may be in this context, 
subordination restricts the available tools.202 Moreover, as described above, the 
women’s suffrage movement was active on multiple fronts using multiple tools, 
such as campaigning for mainstream candidates, testifying to Congress, and en-
gaging in direct action voting and other forms of civil disobedience.203 Their legal 
arguments were part and parcel of a larger political movement. 
During Reconstruction, their legal arguments were potent enough to take 
center stage. Section One of the Fourteenth Amendment, speaking in expansive 
terms to the rights of equality, actually could have embraced women’s rights far 
earlier if only the political landscape had been somewhat more favorable.204 If 
Lincoln had remained alive, if Victoria Woodhull had not been as vulnerable to 
political attack, if Reconstruction and its legal underpinnings could have sur-
vived for a longer period—if only, if only—the fundamentally solid legal argu-
ments of the late nineteenth century women’s movement might have prevailed.205 
In the tumultuous political dynamics of post-Civil War America, those who 
were treated unequally and asserted claims to equality needed a broad reading of 
the Fourteenth Amendment.206 In this regard, efforts to secure autonomy and 
                                                        
[T]he victories [antidiscrimination law] offers can be ephemeral and the risks of engagement 
substantial.”). 
200  Id. at 1366 (“[E]ngaging in rights rhetoric can be an attempt to turn society’s ‘institutional 
logic’ against itself—to redeem some of the rhetorical promises and the self-congratulations 
that seem to thrive in American political discourse.”). 
201  Id. at 1358–59, 1365 (“It matters little whether the coerced group rejects the dominant 
ideology and . . . offer[s] a competing conception of the world; if they have been labeled 
‘other’ by the dominant ideology, they are not heard. . . . The underlying problem . . . [is] how 
to extract from others [what] others are not predisposed to give.”). 
202  Id. at 1385 (noting “the limited range of options . . . [for those] deemed ‘other,’ and the 
unlikelihood that specific demands for inclusion and equality would be heard if articulated in 
other terms”). 
203  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 20–23 (“[T]his episode in women’s rights . . . treats rights 
. . . as something to be won and exercised collectively rather than individually; as the object 
of political struggle as much as of judicial resolution . . . . Reconstruction was an age of popular 
constitutionalism. . . . The New Departure took on meaning precisely because of this direct 
action element.”). 
204  Id. at 27 (“[S]ome of the leaders of the Republican party supported women’s rights claims 
on the Constitution.”). 
205  Id. at 34 (“The deepest mark of the New Departure . . . was to make women’s rights and 
political equality indelibly constitutional issues.”). 
206  Id. at 21–22 (observing that the suffragists’ constitutional strategy “embodied a radical 
democratic vision”). 
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freedom for women were inextricable from efforts to secure autonomy and free-
dom for African-Americans.207 Together these movements would rise or fall. For 
generations, they mostly fell.208 Awareness of their legal linkages and of the sim-
ilarity in the powers arrayed against them could have driven the anti-subordina-
tion movements into coalition.209 While for a variety of reasons this did not al-
ways occur, the substantive and strategic reasons to build coalitions were 
discernable then—as, I would suggest, they are discernable now.210 
When women’s rights activists in the nineteenth century deployed Amer-
ica’s constitutional discourse to challenge the structural inequalities that limited 
women’s autonomy and women’s freedom, they drew on the emancipation argu-
ments of African-Americans freed from slavery.211 Periodically, they showed 
cognizance of the reality that the category “woman” included many who were 
multiply oppressed by race, class, national origin, and other socially defined cat-
egories, glimpsing the connections between, and the complexity of, parallel lib-
eration struggles.212 Sometimes they also showed cognizance of the reality that 
insistence on equality, an important aspect of the women’s movement, was a 
generalizable principle.213 Autonomy, equality, freedom—even when framed le-
galistically as the rights of citizenship—belonged to all human beings, placing 
                                                        
207  Id. at 22 (articulating the suffragists’ view that “[i]n the battle for the rights of the black 
man, the rights of all had been secured”). 
208  Id. at 30–31 (noting Victoria Woodhull’s observation in the early 1870s that “Republicans, 
‘frightened by the grandeur and the extent’ of the amendments they had enacted, had retreated 
to the enemies’ doctrine of states’ rights, where their own greatest achievements would ulti-
mately be undone”). 
209  See BAER, supra note 28, at 25, 90 (stating that joined by “the ease with which dominant 
groups can exploit them,” the equality movements for African-Americans and for women both 
advanced Fourteenth Amendment arguments, because “[t]he language of Section I, on its face, 
was broad enough to protect women as well as racial minorities”); see also Smith, supra note 
43, at 240–41 (“[P]atriarchy’s appeal is in large measure the same as the appeal of racial and 
ethnic forms of civic inequality: all these hierarchies preserve a community order and identity 
that the dominant white male citizens find more comfortable, particularly in times of change 
and stress, than . . . egalitarianism.”). 
210  See CHUSED & WILLIAMS, supra note 30, at 845 (“Consensus building, the choice of rhet-
oric, decisions about which issues to include or exclude, and other strategic questions are as 
problematic to feminists today as those that confronted our foremothers.”); see also Smith, 
supra note 43, at 264 (describing developments that undermined the suffrage movement’s al-
liances with working women, immigrants, and blacks). 
211  See BAER, supra note 28, at 71, 73 (presenting historical evidence that “[t]he anti-slavery 
theory of equality, derived from the Declaration and its belief that all were equally entitled to 
rights,” was “enacted” into the Fourteenth Amendment). 
212  See DuBois, supra note 46, at 26–27 (reporting Victoria Woodhull’s argument that the 
disenfranchisement prohibited by the Fifteenth Amendment implicitly included women, be-
cause “a race comprises all the people, male and female”). 
213  Id. at 22 (explaining the “radical reconstructionist” argument made by the women’s suf-
frage movement that “[t]he war had expanded the rights of ‘proud white man’ to all those who 
had historically been deprived of them,” such that “the benefits of national citizenship were 
equally the rights of all”). 
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the struggle for women’s rights under the spacious umbrella of other important 
struggles for equality.214 
The universal discourse of citizenship adopted in feminism’s first wave 
linked women’s nascent autonomy claims to the autonomy claims of other sub-
ordinated groups who were challenging the unjust hierarchies embedded in nine-
teenth century American society. Coalitional needs and prospects, though only 
partially realized, emerge from the dynamics of nineteenth century activism. In 
a meaningful sense, this context breaks ground for the “intersectionality” and 
“anti-essentialism” analyses that were yet to be framed.215 
Hierarchy excludes many, and anti-subordinationists, feminists among them, 
are joined in the fight to reconstruct social structures—including the legal sys-
tem—to more fairly and equally allocate material and social power.216 Although 
the Privileges or Immunities Clause was hollowed out by nineteenth century 
judges, its anti-subordination language remains part of our constitutional inher-
itance.217 This inheritance poses a nagging question for equality movements not 
only about what might have been, but also—given the right confluence of legal 
strategy and jurisprudential will—what might still be.218 
                                                        
214  See Hernández-Truyol, supra note 5, at 51 (“Feminist judging liberates . . . all sexes, from 
the intertwined subordinations of gender, sex, sexuality, race, ethnicity, class, religion, nation-
ality, language, culture, and ability. Feminist judging embraces all people as fully human and 
deserving of real equality.”). 
215  See Stanchi, Berger & Crawford, supra note 3, at 21 (asserting that intersectionality and 
anti-essentialism are recurring feminist themes). 
216  This result would fulfill the wishes of those like Chase Going Woodhouse, an early twen-
tieth century feminist, who used to say that she hoped her tombstone could be inscribed with 
the words: “Born a woman. Died a person.” See COTT, supra note 19, at 238 (describing the 
desire among early feminists to leave subordination behind and to “break into the human 
race”). 
217  See Kurland, supra note 126, at 420 (“[T]here the clause is, an empty and unused vessel 
which affords the Court full opportunity to determine its contents . . . .”). 
218  See id. at 419–20 (arguing that the contents of the Privileges or Immunities Clause are 
capable of revival, providing more substantive protections of adequate opportunities for all 
Americans than do the concepts of due process and equal protection). 
